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How many dimensions are really being measured? 
 
 






This paper assesses the validity of the perception-based governance indicators used by the US 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) for aid allocation decisions. By conducting 
Explanatory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis of data from 1996 to 2009, we find that 
although the MCA purports to measure seven distinct dimensions of governance, only two 
discrete underlying dimensions, the ‘participatory dimension of governance’ and the ‘overall 
quality of governance,’ can be identified. Our results also show that some of the doubts that 
have been raised concerning the validity of perception-based governance indicators are less 
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In 2003, the Bush administration launched the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), an 
innovative development assistance program whose aid allocation mechanism is largely based 
on a competitive assessment of developing countries’ governance performance. In contrast to 
the donor agencies who, in response to the aid effectiveness debate, implemented new or 
modified existing aid programs in order to encourage improved governance under existing 
partnership frameworks, the MCA made good governance an explicit and rigid precondition 
for the granting of aid to developing countries. The MCA is the first and only bilateral aid 
agency that has adopted a competitive aid allocation mechanism which explicitly relies on a 
set of publicly available governance indicators. 
With the MCA’s increasing significance – the program has since its foundation in 2003 
committed nine billion US dollars in grants to 18 developing countries – an extensive debate 
on its modalities of delivery has ensued. Various aspects, such as the strictly bilateral 
approach to program implementation without participation in donor harmonization efforts on 
the ground; its ambiguous relationship to existing US aid agencies such as USAID; and the 
issue of funding volumes and the absorptive capacities of recipient countries, have been 
abundantly analyzed and discussed (see for example Sperling and Hart, 2003; Clemens and 
Radelet, 2003).  
Yet little attention has been devoted thus far to a key question: Are the perception-based 
governance indicators used by the MCA conceptually valid, robust, and therefore appropriate 
for making aid-allocation decisions? In light of the general debate that has emerged on 
whether perception-based governance indicators satisfactorily measure and distinguish 
between various dimensions of governance, this question is particularly salient (Langbein and 
Knack, 2010; Thomas, 2009; Arndt and Oman, 2006).  
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This paper discusses the validity of the MCA’s governance assessment framework. In 
particular, it explores the merits of the argument often voiced in the literature that the 
perception-based governance indicators used by the MCA fail to distinguish between various 
dimensions of governance, especially in the case of developing countries. Using standard 
statistical techniques to detect latent variables, including Explanatory and Confirmatory 
Factor Analysis, we find that while the MCA ostensibly measures seven distinct dimensions 
of governance, only two distinct underlying dimensions – namely, the perceived participatory 
dimension of governance and the perceived overall quality of governance – can be identified. 
Our results suggest that the general doubts that have been voiced concerning these indicators 
– in particular the singular dimensionality of perception-based governance indicators are less 
warranted when the indicators are applied exclusively to developing countries. 
The following section reviews the current debate on the reliability and validity of perception-
based governance indicators. Section 3 provides an overview on the MCA’s program 
modalities and its allocation mechanism. Section 4 assesses empirically to what extent the 
MCA’s specific indicator-based method for measuring the quality of governance is reliable, 
robust and conceptually valid.  
2. Literature Review 
While issues such as institutional development, democratic legitimacy, and accountability 
were of ancillary importance to geo-political and geo-strategic considerations for aid 
allocation during the Cold War era, in the 1990s good governance emerged as the new sine 
qua non of development cooperation (for example Dornboos, 2001; Hermes and Lensink, 
2001; Chhotray and Hulme, 2009). The seminal paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000), which 
identified a strong relationship between sound policies and economic growth, as well as an 
abundance of subsequent research provided the empirical grounds for a realignment of aid 
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allocation mechanisms towards explicit or implicit conditionality on good governance (for 
example Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Arndt and Oman, 2006).  
In recent years, the supply of governance indicators has risen exponentially in line with the 
development community’s growing demand for a quantifiable operationalisation of the 
governance concept. The World Bank Institute suggests that there are currently more than 140 
sets of indicators available, comprising several thousand individual quantitative measures 
(World Bank Institute, 2006). The best-known indicators are those provided by the World 
Bank, the World Bank Institute, the International Country Risk Guide, Freedom House, the 
Heritage Foundation, and Transparency International. Because of their extensive country 
coverage, sophisticated statistical methodology, and excellent methodological documentation, 
the indicators provided by the World Wide Governance Project of the World Bank Institute 
have in recent years advanced to become the most widely used and quoted governance 
indicators (Kaufmann et al., 1999a; 1999b; 2004; 2005; 2007; 2008; Arndt, 2010).1 
Recent research has discussed several aspects of conceptual and technical limitations of 
perception-based governance indicators in general, and the World Wide Governance 
Indicators (WGIs) in particular. Kurtz and Schrank (2007) suggest that the dominant measures 
of governance, in particular the WGIs, are problematic and suffer from perceptual biases and 
adverse selection in sampling. Similarly, Thomas (2009) argues that due to a lack of empirical 
evidence in support of their construct validity, the WGIs are in effect an elaborate but 
unsupported hypothesis. Langbein and Knack (2010) generally question the ability of the 
WGIs to measure distinct underlying concepts and present empirical evidence of strong 
content overlap and a tautological construct. 
Due to a lack of alternatives, these perception-based indicators are nevertheless used for 
ranking countries and for subsequent aid allocation (Kaufmann et al., 2002); the most 
prominent example being the MCA. Accordingly, the question is naturally raised as to 
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whether these indicators are suitable for assessing policy performance in developing 
countries. 
While the existing literature focuses to large extent on the overall properties of governance 
indicators (for example Kurtz and Schrank, 2007; Langbein and Knack, 2010), the present 
paper seeks to make a unique contribution by assessing to what extent the application of these 
indicators to developing countries yields reliable and robust conclusions in terms of 
dimensionality and measurement reliability. In this way, our analysis, which specifically 
examines the MCA’s aid allocation mechanisms, aims to provide important insights into the 
dimensionality and validity of governance assessments of Low Income Countries (LICs).  
3. The Millennium Challenge Account 
3.1 Scale and Scope 
At the 2002 UN Financing for Development Conference, President G.W. Bush announced the 
establishment of a new Millennium Challenge Account to provide an additional five billion 
dollars per year in grants to developing countries. In the words of the President, aid would be 
disbursed to those countries that govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic 
freedom.2 Aside from the amount of aid promised, the most notable aspect of the MCA 
program is its competitive allocation process, which uses predefined and transparent 
governance measures to determine country eligibility. This means that the MCA’s allocation 
policy is clearly segregated from US foreign policy objectives; an aspect that has received 
considerable attention (Radelet, 2002a; 2002b; OECD, 2003). Furthermore, the program 
displays a commitment to strengthening recipient ownership and accountability by assigning 
developing countries the lead in program development and implementation. This has been 
perceived as a progress towards delivering on the commitments to provide more effective aid 




Table 1: MCA Appropriations in USD Billions 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
MCA funds requested by the President 1.300 2.500 3.000 3.000 3.000 2.225 
MCA funds appropriated by Congress 0.994 1.488 1.752 1.752 1.752 1.486 
U.S. International Development and 
Humanitarian Assistance* 13.807 17.696 16.693 15.524 14.074 22.095 
MCA funds as a percentage of U.S. 
International Development and 
Humanitarian Assistance 
7.20 8.41 10.50 11.29 12.45 6.73 
* According to outlays of functions and sub-functions of the Office of Management and Budget of the White House. This 
includes funding for bilateral development programs such as USAID, the MCA, the Global HIV/AIDS Fund, assistance to 
transition countries, contributions to multilateral organizations, the Child Survival and Disease Program, humanitarian aid, 
emergency relief, migration and refugee assistance, and efforts to combat the drug trade. 
Source: Tarnoff, 2009 and The White House, (2010). 
 
Although the original commitment of an additional five billion US dollars per year has never 
been met, the scale of MCA funds is significant in both absolute and relative terms (Table 1). 
In 2008, funds appropriated under the new program amounted to 1.75 billion US dollars and 
accounted for approximately 12.5 per cent of US core development assistance, as classified 
under the budgetary sub-function International Development and Humanitarian Assistance 
(IDHA).3  
This is a substantial figure, considering that a large share of US assistance subsumed under 
the IDHA function is dedicated to emergency relief or tied to reconstruction programs from 
the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since fiscal year 2004, a total of 9.22 
billion US dollars has been appropriated to the MCA from the US federal budget.4 So far, 18 
recipient countries have received funding through so-called Millennium Challenge 
Compacts.5  
In order to realize the MCA’s transformational potential and encourage recipient countries to 
implement projects and programs critical to their economic and social development, the MCA 
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intended to place its assistance among the top aid donors in eligible countries (Nowels, 2006). 
Over the last five years the financial value of compact programs has constantly increased. 
While the compact agreements signed in 2005 averaged around 180 million US dollars, more 
recent programs have been significantly larger in size, with commitments in 2008 reaching an 
average of approximately 450 million US dollars. In several heavily-aided developing 
countries that receive significant amounts of aid, including Burkina Faso, Ghana, 
Mozambique, and Tanzania, the MCA has become one of the largest bilateral development 
assistance programs (Tarnoff, 2009; OECD/DAC CRS, 2010). 
 
3.2 The MCA’s Allocation Methodology 
Recipient countries are selected based on three-step procedure:6 
(i) Each year candidate countries are identified according to GNI per capita thresholds, as 
defined by the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) for Low 
Income Countries (LICs) and Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs).7 Countries 
subject to legal provisions prohibiting assistance by US legislation are excluded 
(Millennium Challenge Act of 2003 Sec. 606(a) (1) (b)).  
(ii) On the basis of a range of third-party indicators (17 at present), grouped into three broad 
policy dimensions – ruling justly, investing in people, and economic freedom – the 
MCA’s board subsequently determines which of these candidate countries are generally 
eligible for MCA assistance (Table 2).8 To qualify for funding, countries must perform 
above the median in the first governance indicator under the ruling justly category (the 
World Bank Institute’s Control of Corruption indicator) in relation to their peers, i.e. 
other LICs or LMICs, and score above the median in at least half of the indicators under 
each of the three policy categories.9  
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(iii) Finally, eligible countries may prepare and negotiate compact program proposals. 
 
Table 2: Indicators used in 2009 
Category Indicator Type/Remarks Source 
WGI Control of 
Corruption 
(WGI CC)* 
Perception-based composite indicator measuring the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 




Perception-based composite indicator measuring the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation, and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies 
WGI Rule of Law 
(WGI RL)* 
Perception-based composite indicator measuring the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
WGI Voice and 
Accountability 
(WGI VA)* 
Perception-based composite indicator measuring citizens’ ability to 
participate in selecting their government, freedom of expression, freedom of 








Civil Liberties  
(FH CLI) 
Perception-based indicators consisting of three (FH PRI) and four (FH CLI) 
sub-categories measuring on a 40 (FH PRI) and 60 (FH CLI) point scale to 
what extent universal political rights and civil liberties can be freely 
exercised. Assessment is undertaken by selected analysts and affiliated 
advisers. 
Freedom House 
Immunization Rates Un-weighted average of (third dose of diphtheria toxoid, tetanus toxoid, and pertussis vaccine) DPT3 and measles immunization rates. WHO 
Public Expenditure on 














Gross intake ratio to last grade of primary education for females, measuring 
the total number of new female entrants in the last grade of primary 
education, regardless of age, as a share of the total female population of 






Index indicator calculated as un-weighted average from Eco-Region 
Protection, access to clean water and sanitation, and child mortality 
CIESIN and 
YCLEP 
Inflation Rate Measures annual percentage change averages in consumer prices for the year. Hurdle currently set at 15 per cent. 
IMF World 
Economic Outlook 






Composite indicator measuring scale of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers 
relative to all other countries using average tariff rates and a non-tariff 






Perception-based composite governance indicator measuring the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 




Index indicator ranging from 0 to 1 calculated from the un-weighted 
average of the two index sub-indicators ‘number of days to start a business’ 




Land Rights and 
Access 
Weighted average calculated from IFAD’s Access to Land indicator (50 per 
cent) and IFC’s indicators measuring the days and the costs to register 
property (25 per cent each). 
IFAD and IFC 
* Definitions taken from Kaufmann et al., (2007). 
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Selection of eligible countries depends in large part on their perceived good governance 
performance: The ruling justly category consists solely of indicators measuring governance 
outcomes.11 Furthermore, one of the six governance indicators in this category, the Control of 
Corruption indicator, serves as an absolute hurdle. Thus, in an extreme case, a candidate 
country may perform well on 16 of the 17 indicators, but fall below the median on the Control of 
Corruption indicator, thus become ineligible for aid (Radelet, 2002b). In total, seven of the 17 
MCA policy measures are governance indicators.  
Two of the seven indicators, the Civil Liberties Indicator (CLI) and the Political Rights 
Indicator (PRI), are compiled by the conservative Washington-based think tank Freedom 
House (FH). According to Freedom House’s methodological note, the FH PRI aims to map 
the quality of the electoral process, the degree of political pluralism and participation, as well 
as the functioning of government. The FH CLI seeks to measure country performance in the 
following three sub-categories: freedom of expression and belief; associational, organizational 
rights and rule of law; and personal autonomy and individual rights.12 Coverage currently 
includes 193 countries and 15 territories.  
The remaining five indicators in the ruling justly categories are published by the World Bank 
Institute under its Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) project.13 The WGIs are 
composed of several hundred sub-indicators drawn from 37 different data sources. According 
to the authors, these indicators capture the fundamental dimensions of governance:  
⎯ Control of Corruption (WGI CC; extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state 
by elites and private interests);  
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⎯ Voice and Accountability (WGI VA; the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media); 
⎯ Regulatory Quality (WGI RQ; the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development),  
⎯ Rule of Law (WGI RL; extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence); and  
⎯ Government Effectiveness (WGI GE; quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
such policies).14 
As with the FH indicators, the WGIs are entirely based on perceptual data and currently cover 
203 countries and territories from 1996 to 2009.15  
 
3.3 The MCA’s Governance Concept 
The MCA’s selective and competitive allocation methodology was strongly influenced by the 
international development discourse of the late 1990s (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009). While 
Good Governance emerged as a mainstream concept in development cooperation and 
research, evidence suggested that conventional policy conditionality had because of its 
ineffectiveness in inducing institutional, political, and economic reforms yielded dissatisfying 
results (Lockwood, 2005; Van de Walle, 2005). For this reason, ex-post selectivity (meaning 
the allocation of development assistance to countries which have already shown credible 
ownership and commitment towards comprehensive reforms) evolved as a new guiding 
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principle for the allocation of development assistance (World Bank, 1998; Burnside and 
Dollar, 2000). The competitive aid allocation mechanism established under the MCA reflects 
and incorporates the principle of ex-post selectivity.  
Another factor affecting the MCA’s allocation scheme is public opinion in the US (Chhotray 
and Hulme, 2009). With civil society, influential NGOs and media taking a much more 
critical stance towards public aid monies than in Europe, the new aid program has been 
premised on a tightly supervised and deductive framework to ensure domestic accountability 
and the regular provision of evidence on the proper use of funds to the public. 
Under the institutional economic theory that informs the aid programs of the World Bank and 
other leading development agencies, governance is understood as a set of institutional rules 
for the coordination of social, political, and economic activities, rules that determine and/or 
shape a country’s ability to develop and generate economic growth (Benz et al., 2007). Yet 
while institutional economics are per se positivistic, perception-based governance indicators 
composed of third-party expert assessments and expert polls do not represent a form of de 
jure or de facto assessment, but instead draw on a universalistic, normative governance 
concept whose determinates are explicitly invariant across political, cultural, and sociological 
contexts, i.e. across countries as well as over time (Chhotray and Hulme, 2009).  
While the MCA justifies the use of governance indicators by appealing to the aforementioned 
research that suggests there is a positive relationship between good policies and growth on the 
one hand and the effectiveness of aid on the other, the MCA does not provide any empirical 
or analytical evidence that the seven governance indicators reflect or relate to this very 
abstract and broad concept of governance. As the reliability of the seven governance 
indicators depends on their validity and ability to discriminate effectively among the MCA’s 
seven dimensions of governance, the lack of an explicit conceptual foundation seems 
particularly problematic. This is all the more true in light of recent research that has raised 
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considerable concerns about the reliability of perception-based governance indicators, 
particularly the WGIs. 
4. Dimensionality of MCA’s Governance Concept 
To analyze whether the governance indicators used by the MCA depict one or perhaps several 
dimensions of governance, we use Explanatory Factor Analysis (EFA) to identify dominant 
underlying, unobservable variables. Based on these results, a causal model is set up and tested 
by means of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). The time frame for the analysis is 
determined by the availability of the indicators; it covers the years 1996 to 2009. Before 
turning to the empirical results, statistical relations between the indicators, either by cause or 
by definition, are highlighted. 
 
4.1 Preliminaries 
A certain lack of clarity in the MCA’s governance concept is already apparent in the arbitrary 
and partially redundant classification framework. For example, FH CLI (Civil Liberties) and 
FH PRI (Political Rights) are used as two representative source indictors for the construction 
of the aggregated WGI VA (Voice and Accountability) (Kaufmann et al., 2008). All three 
indicators comprise measures of perceived freedom of expression and association, as well as 
the right to organize; FH PR and WGI VA both gauge the extent to which the political system 
incorporates meaningful participation of the citizenry in selecting the government and shaping 
its activities. The substantive overlap between the WGI VA, FH PRI, and FH CLI is thus 
significant. Furthermore, it shows that several sub-components of the WGIs in particular 
those of the WGI CC, WGI GE, WGI RL and WGI RQ are difficult to separate delineate 
accurately. The perceived enforceability of contracts, for example, is probably a dimension of 
both the WGI RL and WGI GE. Moreover, the perceived degree of effectiveness of 
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institutions such as general accounting offices or public audit services could be subsumed 
under both the WGI GE and WGI CC. Table 3 provides an indicative and incomplete 
overview of the classification congruence among the seven indicators. A high degree of 
substantive overlap (grey shaded fields) appears to exist between the WGI VA, FH PRI, and 
FH CLI as well as the WGI CC, WGI GE, WGI RL, and WGI RQ. 
Simple bivariate correlations calculated from a sample covering nine years and a minimum of 
185 countries (all countries sample) confirms this pattern. Two principle interdependent 
groups of variables with an extremely high bivariate correlation (above 90 per cent) can be 
distinguished: 
⎯ The first group includes the WGI CC, WGI GE, WGI RL, and WGI RQ,  
⎯ the second group comprises the two FH indicators and the WGI VA.  
The same pattern can be found in the bivariate correlation matrix calculated from LICs (LIC 
sample), albeit with a significantly lower degree of correlation. 
These results yield two preliminary indications: First, the indicators might be, as suggested by 
Langbein and Knack (2010), generally tautological or have difficulties in distinguishing 
between the seven dimensions they purport to measure. Second, as bivariate correlation 
patterns for LICs are much weaker, indicators seem to have heteroscedastic properties with 
respect to income since developed countries generally score high in all seven governance 
dimensions.16 Accordingly, previous findings deducted from empirical analysis which did not 
discriminate between different country groups (that is LICs, LMICs) might have produced 
premature conclusions with regard to the dimensionality of the perception-based indicators, 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Bivariate correlation coefficients of MCA governance indicators, 1996–2009 











FH CL FH PR 
WGI CC  1.000       
WGI GE 0.932 1.000      
WGI RL 0.939 0.936 1.000     
WGI RQ 0.856 0.916 0.881 1.000    
WGI VA 0.763 0.763 0.793 0.771 1.000   
FH CL 0.615 0.616 0.646 0.641 0.937 1.000  
FH PR 0.6668 0.666 0.704 0.690 0.947 0.937 1.000 
Low Income Countries        
WGI CC  1.000       
WGI GE  0.676 1.000      
WGI RL  0.764 0.783 1.000     
WGI RQ 0.505 0.715 0.653 1.000    
WGI VA 0.391 0.464 0.536 0.532 1.000   
FH CL 0.301 0.363 0.428 0.424 0.915 1.000  
FH PR 0.331 0.392 0.466 0.485 0.897 0.868 1.000 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
4.2 Explanatory Factor Analysis 
A method frequently used to test for construct validity and to control for underlying or 
unobservable source variables (that is abstract concepts) is Explanatory Factor Analysis, or 
EFA. This analytical method is based on the assumption that a set of observable variables is 
loaded by a number of underlying factors of which some are common and some are unique 
(Kim and Mueller, 1990; 1994). Hence, EFA provides an indication of the extent to which the 
variance of the seven indicators can be explained by separate, distinguishable dimensions 
(unique factors), and the extent to which variance is driven by a structure of common, 
indistinguishable dimensions (common factors). It is assumed that (i) common factors are 
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orthogonal, (ii) that unique factors are uncorrelated with each other, and (iii) that common 
factors are uncorrelated with the unique factors. 
Starting with the sample covering all countries, our calculations identify one dominant factor 
that explains 80 per cent of the existing variance. The corresponding eigenvalue of this factor 
is 5.6, compared to 0.8 for the second (Table 5). The criteria applied to determine how many 
common factors to retain are taken from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). Kaiser 
recommends dropping factors with an eigenvalue smaller than one. Jolliffe (2002) suggests a 
cutoff of 0.7, as simulation studies find that Kaiser’s criterion might in the presence of 
sampling errors lead to a situation in which the population eigenvalue is significantly higher 
than the sampling eigenvalue. As both criteria yield the same result, a one-factor model is 
appropriate in the all-country sample. This finding is in line with previous studies, for 
example Langbein and Knack (2010), who also emphasize that the WGI indicators in fact all 
measure the same basic concept.  
Table 5: Explanatory Factor Analysis, All Countries, 1996–2009 
Factors Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 5.664 4.868 0.809 0.809 
Factor 2 0.796 0.762 0.114 0.923 
Factor 3 0.034 0.048 0.005 0.928 
Observations    1,820 
Source: Own calculations. 
As MCA uses the governance indicators to identify good performers among the group of 
developing countries for purposes of aid allocation, the subsequent empirical analysis focuses 
on LICs. It yields a surprisingly clear-cut result: The assumption of a one-factor model is no 
longer valid. The explained variance of the first factor drops to 60 per cent and the eigenvalue 
of the second factor rises to 1.23 (Table 6). The second common factor explains 16 per cent of 
total variance. Overall, approximately 80 per cent of total sample variance can be explained 
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by two underlying factors. Both the Kaiser and Jolliffe criterion recommend sticking to a two-
factor solution.  
Table 6: Explanatory Factor Analysis, Low Income Countries, 1996–2009 
Factors Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 4.165 2.934 0.595 0.595 
Factor 2 1.231 1.124 0.176 0.771 
Factor 3 0.107 0.136 0.015 0.786 
Observations    741 
Source: Own calculations. 
The EFA results do not significantly change when factors are determined for each year or for 
sub-periods between 1998 and 2007 (see Appendix IV and V). Furthermore, they are robust 
with respect to the factor extraction method used.17 In the case of orthogonal factor analysis 
with standardized variables,18 factor loadings are equivalent to correlations between factors 
and variables (Kim and Mueller, 1990). 
As displayed in Figure 1, the factor loading and uniqueness pattern of the rotated solution 
confirms the hypothesis of two interdependent sets of indicators, each predominantly driven 
by one underlying factor:19 
(i) The first set is loaded primarily by indicators measuring the perceived quality 
and efficiency of government institutions. These are WGI GE, WGI CC, 
WGI RL, and WGI RQ. 
(ii) The second is mainly loaded by FH PRI, FH CLI, and WGI VA, reflecting the 
extent to which civil society and the citizenry is perceived to be in the 
position to control and monitor government institutions. This can be 




Source: Own calculations. 
These findings partly contradict the conclusions of Langbein and Knack (2010) who, based on 
a similar statistical analysis, comprising developed and developing countries, suggest that the 
WGIs generally fail to distinguish between different dimensions of governance and are a 
function of only one latent variable or underlying factor. The inclusion of developed countries 
with high across-the-board rankings probably results in a lower factor complexity, which is 
corroborated by the analysis covering the full sample. However, in case of the aid allocation, 
the concentration on a model tailored for LIC countries seems appropriate. 
4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The EFA model with two common factors measuring the perceived quality and efficiency of 
government institutions and the perceived participatory dimension of governance provides 
well-interpretable and useful results. However, as EFA rests on several rigid assumptions (for 
example that all observed variables (indicators) are directly affected by all common factors 
and that common factors are uncorrelated) results should be subjected to further scrutiny, such 
as Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). The CFA model structure of the observed and 
unobserved factors is identical to the one derived by EFA (two common factor model).20  
Factor 1: Perceived Quality of 
Governance 













λ11=  0.76 
λ21=  0.18 
λ21=  0.24 
λ22=  0.83 
λ31=  0.84 
λ32=  0.31 
λ41=  0.36 
λ42=  0.67 
λ51=  0.30 
λ52=  0.92 
λ61=  0.92 





λ71=  0.23 






Figure 1: Loading Pattern, Orthogonal Two Common Factor Model (LIC Sample) 
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Yet in contrast to EFA, which aims to determine the number of latent variables – that is the 
number of unobservable governance dimensions based on a set of assumptions about the 
latent variables’ relation to the observables – CFA allows for different identified model 
specifications to be compared and tested, such as the number of common factors, correlated 
common factors, correlated errors, and different degrees of factor complexity.21 The standard 
CFA estimation technique of Maximum Likelihood estimation gives standard errors for factor 
loadings and several fit criteria, such as the Root Mean Square Residual (RMSR), 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI).  
The loading structure of the best fitting CFA LIC model is shown in Figure 2. All factor 
loadings are significant at the one-per cent level. Confidence intervals for the point estimates 
are rather small (see Appendix VI). RMSR (0.02), CFI (0.95), and TLI (0.93) indicate an 
overall very good fit of the specification (Hair et al., 2006). Other loading specifications, in 
particular those with a single common factor, correlated errors, and a lower or higher factor 
complexity, had to be rejected due to inadequate fit or insignificant loading patterns.22  
 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Factor 1: Perceived Quality of 
Governance 













λ11=  0.87 
λ21=  0.79 
λ31=  0.92 
λ41=  0.74 
λ52=  0.98 
λ62=  0.93 δ6=0.13 
Uniqueness7 
WGI RQ 






corr =  0.56 
Figure 2: Loading Pattern CFA Model (LIC Sample) 
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While the strong CFA loading pattern confirms the two common factors result for LICs 
derived from EFA, it detects a significant positive correlation between the two unobservables. 
Accordingly, the perceived overall quality and efficiency of government institutions and the 
perceived participatory dimension of government have to be considered as discrete but related 
concepts that in the case of the MCA are measured through several similar proxies.  
5. Conclusion 
Whereas past research has focused on the conceptual characteristics of perception-based 
governance indicators in general, this paper provides a specific analysis of the MCA’s 
application of governance indicators for aid allocation. Our research is of special interest to 
policy makers who rely on these indicators when making aid-allocation decisions. 
From the results presented above, two principal conclusions can be drawn: First, our research 
shows that the meaningful use of quantitative perception-based governance indicators for the 
allocation of ODA to developing countries is a delicate and non-trivial undertaking. This is 
the case not only because of the difficulties in ranking point estimates in the presence of large 
measurement errors and relative peer-related, time-variant scaling – a topic that has been 
frequently discussed – but also, and more crucially, because of persisting uncertainties 
regarding measurement reliability and the conceptual validity of the selected measures. The 
seven indicators appear to have been selected in a somewhat arbitrary manner, in the absence 
of an effort to scrutinize their measurement validity and dimensionality. The result is a 
distorted and only ostensibly transparent allocation mechanism. Although the MCA uses 
seven indicators that purportedly measure different dimensions of governance, only two 
underlying governance concepts can be clearly identified – namely, the perceived 
participatory dimension of governance and the perceived overall quality of governance. To 
eliminate the most fundamental shortcomings, the indicators should be merged using 
21 
 
weighted factor scores in accordance with the identified dimensional pattern or redundant and 
congruent indicators should be dropped.  
Second, the general doubts that have been raised in numerous papers concerning the validity 
of perception-based governance indicators such as the WGIs – particularly with regard to their 
singular dimensionality – appear less problematic insofar as the assessment of developing 
countries is concerned. The single dimensionality identified for the WGIs by Langbein and 
Knack (2010) is apparently to large extent caused by the heteroscedastic properties of the all-
country sample. When excluding more developed countries who generally perform well 
across the board and produce little sample variance, a more nuanced picture emerges. Looking 
exclusively at the MCA’s use of the WGIs to assess developing and least developed countries, 




                                                
1  The Worldwide Governance Indicators were initially developed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zido-
Lobatón in 1999. Since 2003 the authors’ team has been composed of Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo 
Mastruzzi. 
2  See: Remarks to the United Nations Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, March 22, 2002. 
3  Data reported under this sub-function are not identical with OECD/DAC Official Development Assistance (ODA) figures 
as the two statistical concepts diverge significantly. A comparison of Official Development Assistance and U.S. Foreign 
Assistance Reporting can be found under http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/about/reporting_comparison.html. 
4  However, program disbursal is significantly behind schedule. By March 2009 only USD 1.2 billion had been released for 
projects and programs under implementation (Tarnoff, 2009). 
5  The countries are Armenia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, El Salvador, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, and Vanuatu. 
6  To encourage committed non-qualifying countries to improve their overall governance and service delivery performance 
the MCA also provides funding under so-called ‘Threshold Programs’. Threshold Programs aim to help countries 
undertake institutional and policy reforms in areas where they have failed to meet MCA’s performance criteria. 
According to current legislation, not more than 10 percent of overall MCA appropriations may be provided to Threshold 
Countries (Nowels, 2006). 
7  The definition follows the thresholds as defined in the World Bank’s lending categories and not according to the 
analytical classifications of the World Development Indicators. In fiscal years 2004 and 2005, candidate status was 
restricted to LICs only. 
8  This refers to the list of indicators for fiscal year 2009. Indicators have been repeatedly revised and amended (MCA, 
2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). 
9  The board is however left with substantial discretion in selecting eligible countries: ‘A review of the history of the MCA 
selections suggests that the Board is guided by, but not entirely bound to, the outcome of the performance indicator 
review process; board members can apply discretion in their selection. Performance trends, missing or old date, and 
recent policy actions might come into play during selection deliberations.’ Further: ‘The Board also examines whether a 
country performs substantially below average on any single indicator and whether their selection was supported by 
supplemental information’ (Tarnoff, 2009). 
10  The indicator draws on trade-weighted average tariff rates and penalty scores for non-tariff barriers (NTB). Weights are 
calculated based on the share of imports for each good. Penalty scores reflect the extent to which NTBs are used to 
impede imports of goods and services. See also http://www.heritage.org/index/Download.aspx. 
11  It is important to note that the indicators used here measure perceived governance outcomes and do not compare 
institutions which would require a deeper de jure analysis. 
12  Based on expert appraisals, a weighted scale ranging from 1 to 7 is computed for each of the two indicators. According to 
Freedom House, the sources used for computing the scores are selected and evaluated by a number of analysts and 
consultants who use an array of information, including news reports and information from NGOs, to review the scorings 
and to check for consistency. A more detailed description of the methodology, the experts’ questionnaire and the 
aggregation process can be obtained from http://www.freedomhouse.org. 
13  The WGI project includes the computation of six indicators, five of which are used for the MCA selection process.  
14  All definitions provided in parenthesis are taken from Kaufmann et al., 2007. 
15  The WGIs are composed from 310 individual underlying data sources that are assigned to one of the dimensions and are 
then aggregated using an unobserved component model that attributes weights to individual variables according to their 
estimated precision. For a more detailed description of construction and aggregation and the data sources, see Kaufmann 
et al., 2004; 2005. 
16  The latter hypothesis can be specifically validated by testing the results of bivariate OLS regression for each indicator on 
GNI/capita. The White-test indicates that the null hypothesis of a constant variance of OLS residuals can be rejected at 
the 10 percent level in all cases, except for WGI RQ. The Preusch-Pagan test clearly rejects the homoscedasticity 
hypothesis in five of the seven cases. 
17  Maximum Likelihood and iterated principal factors yield very similar results with only minor deviations. For an overview 
on methods of factor extraction see Kim and Mueller (1994). 
18  For EFA and CFA the sample and sub-samples are normalized such that average is zero and standard deviation is 1 in 
each year. 
19  λik describes the loading of the observed variable j by the common (unobservable) factor k. δj describes the loading of the 
unique factor on the observable variable j. In the case of EFA, squared loadings, for both common and unique factors, can 
be interpreted as the share in the observable’s variance, as the variables are normalized such that their variance is 1. For 
the applied method of rotation see Appendix III. 
20  An explanatory note on the difference between the EFA and CFA method is provided in Appendix II. 
21  The CFA estimation is based on the STATA® Confa algorithm devised by Kolenikov (2009). Results for best fit CFA 
specifications can be found in appendix IV (LIC country sample). 
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Appendix I: Summary Statistics, MCA Governance Indicators, 1996–2009  
 
All Countries*      
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
WGI CC  -0.062 -0.288 0.966 -2.489 2.467 
WGI GE -0.053 -0.249 0.955 -2.394 2.267 
WGI RL -0.089 -0.268 0.950 -2.313 1.963 
WGI RQ  -0.029 -0.152 0.923 -2.652 3.345 
WGI VA  -0.054 -0.095 0.958 -2.150 1.827 
FH CLI   3.310   3.000 1.720   1.000 7.000 
FH PRI   3.368   3.000 2.110   1.000 7.000 
Observations:       1,820     
Low Income Countries*      
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max 
WGI CC  -0.734 -0.769 0.457 -2.489 0.825 
WGI GE  -0.765 -0.771 0.460 -2.394 0.815 
WGI RL -0.781 -0.789 0.523 -2.313 0.864 
WGI RQ -0.703 -0.591 0.545 -2.652 0.688 
WGI VA -0.666 -0.637 0.646 -2.150 1.039 
FH CLI   4.305   4.000 1.290   1.000 7.000 
FHI PRI   4.468   4.000 1.723   1.000 7.000 
Observations:      741     
Source: Own calculations. 















1996 138 61 1.505 22 3.035 
1998 171 76 1.460 31 3.125 
2000 170 78 1.445 24 2.995 
2002 172 76 1.435 26 2.975 
2003 173 73 1.415 30 2,935 
2004 172 70 1.464 27 3,035 
2005 171 70 1.575 30 3,255 
2006 169 65 1.675 30 3,465 
2007 168 64 1.735 28 3,595 
2008 165 57 1.785 29 3,705 
2009 151 51 1.855 26 3,855 
Total: 1,820 741  303  
Source: World Bank, GNI per capita threshold (atlas method), MCA eligibility according to IDA eligibility thresholds. 
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Appendix III: Technical note on EFA and CFA 
 
1. Explanatory Factor Analysis 
EFA is a statistical technique to determine how many underlying common and unique factors 
account for the variance and covariance of the given data (Kim and Mueller, 1994). 
It assumes that the observables are a linear combination of the common and unique factors, 
such that the model can be written in algebraic form: 
   
 with:  obs. variables, 
   unobs. variables, 
    loadings of common factors, 
     loadings of unique factors. 
When standardizing variables, the variance of the observables can be expressed as the sum of 




In orthogonal principal factor analysis, estimates for the factor loadings are obtained by 
solving the eigenequations of the adjusted correlation matrix, where diagonal elements are 
replaced by the estimated communalities h2. Estimates are obtained by calculating the squared 
multiple correlations between each observed variable and the remaining observed variables. 




The relationship between the adjusted correlation matrix R and the factor loading matrix is 
not unique because (1) a specific adjusted correlation matrix can be reproduced by models 
with different numbers of factors and (2) a specific adjusted correlation matrix can be 
generated by a specific number of factors but different factor loading patterns. 
For the extraction of loadings the postulate of parsimonious factorial causation (assuming 
that observables are loaded by a minimum number of factors) and the postulate of simplicity 
(the model with the smallest factor complexity) have to be made. 
Solving the determinant form of the eigenequation and determine eigenvalues: 
 
Where is the adjusted correlation matrix. 
For determining the minimal amount of factors to be retained, several criteria are available, 
such as Kaiser’s (criterion of eigenvalues above 1.0) and Jolliffe’s (criterion of eigenvalues 
above 0.7). 
To achieve maximal simplicity, factors have to be rotated to the final solution. Using the 
Varimax method, simplicity is measured by the variance of the squared loadings for each 
factor: 
 
The general index of simplicity is defined as the sum of the simplicity vk over all factors: 
 
The greatest possible simplicity is obtained when the variance of squared loadings for each 




2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The explanatory power of EFA is limited, for two principal methodological problems exist: (i) 
the structure of factorial causation derived from EFA is obtained by imposing the arbitrary 
postulates of parsimony and simplicity, and (ii) a particular algorithm is imposed on the data 
without leaving much scope to control for model specification. Hence, EFA results can only 
be regarded as indicative and need to be validated by other means such as CFA.  
The unrestricted relation between the observed variables and the underlying factors used in 
CFA is, except for the regression intercept, equivalent to EFA model specification: 
. 
In matrix form the equation can be expressed as:  
 
If unique factors are assumed to be independent of common factors and if variables are 
normalized, then the covariance matrix of the observables is given by:  
. 
As the unconstrained covariance equation contains J. (J+1)/2 independent equations, there are 
J.(J+1)/2 + J.K+J.(K+1)/2 independent parameters. Hence, at least J.K+K.(K+1)/2 restrictions 
are needed to ensure that the model is identified. For sufficient conditions for the 
identification see Bollen (1989). The best model fit was obtained when using a factor 
complexity of one. In this case the model is always identified.  




where S is the maximum likelihood estimate of the covariance matrix of the data. 
Suitable fit indices are (i) the Root Mean Square Residual where the square root of the mean 
of the squared residuals between observed and estimated correlation matrix indicates the fit 
quality (values below 0.05 are considered good fit) and the Comparative Fit Index which 




Appendix IV: Explanatory Factor Analysis, Low Income Countries, 1996-2002 
 
Factors Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 4.067 2.844 0.581 0.581 
Factor 2 1.223 1.197 0.175 0.756 
Factor 3 0.026 0.054 0.004 0.760 
Observations    291 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
Factor Loadings and Uniqueness (rotated) 
 
Observables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
WGI CC 0.827 0.233 0.262 
WGI GE 0.764 0.159 0.391 
WGI RL 0.822 0.311 0.229 
WGI RQ 0.632 0.387 0.451 
WGI VA 0.314 0.909 0.075 
FH CLI 0.200 0.888 0.171 
FH PRI 0.151 0.920 0.131 




Appendix V: Explanatory Factor Analysis, Low Income Countries, 2003-2009 
 
Factors Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 4.317 3.101 0.617 0.617 
Factor 2 1.216 1.006 0.174 0.791 
Factor 3 0.209 0.232 0.030 0.821 
Observations    450 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
Factor Loadings and Uniqueness (rotated) 
 
Observables Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
WGI CC 0.842 0.255 0.225 
WGI GE 0.759 0.204 0.382 
WGI RL 0.852 0.313 0.175 
WGI RQ 0.698 0.353 0.389 
WGI VA 0.276 0.928 0.062 
FH CLI 0.269 0.899 0.120 
FH PRI 0.181 0.924 0.114 





Appendix VI: Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Low Income Countries 1996-2009 
Log Likelihood = -5004.15  Number of observations: 741 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Means       
 WGI CC 0.000 0.037 0.00 1.00 -0.072 0.072 
 WGI GE 0.000 0.037 0.00 1.00 -0.072 0.072 
 WGI RL 0.000 0.037 0.00 1.00 -0.072 0.072 
 WGI RQ 0.000 0.037 0.00 1.00 -0.072 0.072 
 WGI VA 0.000 0.037 0.00 1.00 -0.072 0.072 
 FH CLI 0.000 0.037 0.00 1.00 -0.072 0.072 
 FH PRI 0.000 0.037 0.00 1.00 -0.072 0.072 
Loadings       
Governance       
 WGI CC 0.791 0.031 25.16 0.00 0.729 0.852 
 WGI GE 0.866 0.030 28.61 0.00 0.806 0.925 
 WGI RL 0.917 0.029 31.43 0.00 0.860 0.974 
 WGI RQ 0.741 0.033 22.68 0.00 0.677 0.806 
Voice       
 WGI VA 0.979 0.01964 36.61 0.00 0.927 1.031 
 FH CLI 0.933 0.02477 33.58 0.00 0.879 0.988 
 FH PRI 0.918 0.02222 32.57 0.00 0.862 0.972 
Factor Covariance       
Governance – Governance 1.000 . . . . . 
Voice – Voice 1.000 . . . . . 
Governance – Voice 0.558 0.027 20.15 0.00 0.504 0.613 
Error Variance       
 WGI CC 0.373 0.023 16.20 0.00 0.328 0.418 
 WGI GE 0.249 0.020 12.63 0.00 0.210 0.288 
 WGI RL 0.158 0.017 9.08 0.00 0.124 0.192 
 WGI RQ 0.449 0.027 16.42 0.00 0.395 0.502 
 WGI VA 0.040 0.008 5.29 0.00 0.025 0.055 
 FH CLI 0.127 0.009 13.55 0.00 0.109 0.146 
 FH PRI 0.157 0.011 14.68 0.00 0.136 0.177 
Fit Indices     
CFI 0.947    
TLI 0.932    
RMSR 0.912    
Source: Own calculations.  
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